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Abstract: Individuals bring effort to a group to achieve a common objective. Group membership 
introduces a free riding incentive, reducing effort, as well as a social responsibility incentive, 
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I. Introduction 
Economists have recently started paying more attention to group decision making as many 
economic decisions from the family dinner table to the corporate boardroom often reflect the 
opinions of groups. Within groups, individuals offer input into the decision and collectively 
share in the resulting outcome. Despite the conventional wisdom that two heads are better than 
one, researchers are more equivocal. For example, team-managed mutual funds do no better, and 
sometimes worse, than funds managed by individuals (Chen et al. 2004, Prather and Middleton 
2002). Conversely, others have documented “assembly bonus effects,” where groups outperform 
even their most capable members (Laughlin, Bonner, and Miner 2002). Even without 
collaboration, group membership and the interdependence of members’ payoffs can, in itself, 
alter individual decision making (Sutter 2009; Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini 2007). Thus, 
group performance depends both on the effort individuals bring to the group and the 
collaborative process leading to a collective decision within the group. The goal of this 
manuscript is to disentangle these two effects. 
Individuals often exert a different level of effort when making decisions as part of a 
group versus for themselves. Because personal responsibility for decisions is diluted in a group 
setting, members may free ride or engage in “social loafing,” by reducing personal effort when 
part of a group (Latané, Williams, and Harkins 1979; Karau and Williams 1993). For example, 
groups often produce fewer ideas for how to approach a problem than the same number of 
individuals working alone (Diehl and Stroebe 1987; Mullen, Johnson, and Salas 1991). 
Conversely, as one’s decisions impact the payoffs of other group members, altruism, social 
pressures, shared responsibility, social identity, and group salience may lead to increased effort 
(Tajfel and Turner 1985; Wagner 1995; Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini 2007; Sutter 2009). 
Thus, group membership may induce two opposing forces on an individual’s provision of effort. 
Whatever effort each group member brings, the group translates individual problem-
solving approaches into a single collective action. Some groups are able to identify the member 
with the greatest task-specific expertise (Hill 1982; Henry 1993).  In some cases groups create 
knowledge, resulting in a strategy superior to what any member could obtain alone.  For 
example, Charness, Karni, and Levin (2007, 2010) find that collaboration improves the 
likelihood of correctly answering questions concerning stochastic dominance and conjunctive 
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events. Alternatively, groups might adopt the approach of the most charismatic but not 
necessarily the most capable member allowing misleading intuition or persuasion to win over 
truth (Isenberg 1986; Kerr, MacCoun, and Kramer 1996). For example, Tindale et al. (1996) find 
that groups often favor intuitive but incorrect answers in tasks requiring an understanding of 
probability. Rather than battling for “the truth” to win out, people often practice self-censorship 
to provide the appearance of unanimity (Janis and Mann 1977).1  
We employ an experimental design which allows us to separate the effect of group 
membership on effort from the overall effect of collaboration within groups. Past research 
includes experiments in which groups make a joint decision2  and experiments where subjects are 
members of groups but do not make a joint decision.3 The former is concerned with the effect of 
groups on collective behavior, while the latter is concerned with the effect of group membership 
on individual actions. Our experiment includes both types of groups, similar to Sutter (2009).  
Our subjects participate either as individuals or in one of two group treatments in a series 
of multi-state choice tasks. The tasks are context-free, but may be thought of as selecting an 
insurance plan (option) from among several that cover some eventualities (states) but not others. 
The probability of each eventuality is provided to subjects. Therefore, options may be 
objectively ranked based on each option’s probability of payment. In the individual treatment, 
subjects make decisions and earn payments on their own. In the collaborative group treatment, 
subjects complete the task in groups of three, engaging in free-form, face-to-face discussion. 
Each group makes a joint decision and members earn identical resulting payments. In the non-
collaborative group treatment, subjects are placed in groups of three, but make individual 
decisions without any communication with other group members. Decisions of a single group 
member, selected at random, determine each group member’s identical payment. Collaborative 
groups have both payoff commonality and joint decision making, while non-collaborative groups 
have payoff commonality but individual decision making. While the individual and collaborative 
treatments have many obvious parallels outside of the lab, the non-collaborative treatment does 
not.  This ability to create counterfactual situations is a major advantage of laboratory 
                                                            
1 This phenomenon, termed “groupthink” (Janis 1971), has been well-documented since at least Sherif (1936) and 
Asch (1951). Perhaps for self-validation, people often prefer to conform to the majority view even when it is known 
to be wrong, and prefer to restate known and accepted ideas rather than present new ones (Wittenbaum, Hubbell, 
and Zuckerman 1999). 
2 Such as Cooper and Kagel (2005), Blinder and Morgan (2005, 2008), Kocher and Sutter (2007), and Sutter (2009). 
3 Such as Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007), Sutter (2009), Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo (2009), Chen and Li 
(2009), Charness, Karni, and Levin (2010), Morita and Servátka (2011), and Ioannou, Qi, and Rustichini (2011). 
3 
 
experiments enabling the dissection of hypotheses that may not be possible otherwise.  Our 
artificial groups allow us to address two questions. First, how does group membership, in itself, 
influence individual effort and performance in the absence of collaboration? Second, how does 
collaboration within groups affect effort and the optimality of decisions controlling for the 
commonality of payoffs?  
We report two main results. First, non-collaborative group members engage in free riding 
resulting in a loss of $1.61 to $2.20 on a $20 task payoff. They perform slightly worse than 
subjects in the individual treatment across all tasks, making an optimal decision in 67% of tasks 
as compared to 72% for individuals. However, as task complexity increases resulting in a higher 
cost of effort, the performance disparity between non-collaborative groups and individuals 
widens. We conjecture that the uncertainty of each members’ effort impacting payoffs increases 
free riding tendencies. Each member’s effort pays off with a constant 1/3 probability, thus 
preserving the benefit of investing more effort, while the cost of providing effort increases with 
task complexity. This free-riding effect appears to outweigh the social concerns created by 
payoff commonality. Free-riding is primarily observed among men.4 Additionally, individuals 
with highest aptitude for these tasks, as measured by the cognitive reflection test (Frederick 
2005), exhibit higher levels of free-riding. Thus, the primary effect of group membership, absent 
collaboration, is to reduce the effort that the most capable members bring to the group. Our 
second result is that once group members can collaborate the negative performance effect of free 
riding is no longer observed. The collaborative groups’ superior performance is due to them 
being effective aggregators of information, rather than knowledge creators. Collaborative groups 
do as well as the best individuals, but not better, making optimal decisions in 87% of all tasks.  
Our first finding, that subjects in non-collaborative groups free ride and do no better than 
individuals relates to two recent results. Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007) showed that 
groups affect strategic decision making when group membership is made sufficiently salient 
through payoff dependence or observation of play by group members. Sutter (2009) extends 
those results to a non-strategic setting, and finds that individuals who are part of groups but 
cannot communicate yield similar decisions to those achieved by collaborative groups. These 
studies show that non-collaborative group performance depends on the level of group saliency, 
                                                            
4 Conclusions on the role of sex in free-riding based on public goods experiments have been mixed. Nowell and 
Tinker (1994) report more free-riding by women, while Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993) report the opposite and 
Cadsby and Maynes (1998) find no difference. 
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or social, psychological, and economic ties among group members. Our non-collaborative groups 
differ from those in Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007) and Sutter (2009) in the way 
individuals’ decisions translate into group outcomes. In Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007) 
each individual receives a payment resulting from his or her actions as well as a third of the 
payment received by all other members of his or her group. In Sutter (2009) each group member 
is solely responsible for one-third of all decisions with all group members’ performance summed 
to arrive at the group’s payment. In our experiment each non-collaborative group member makes 
every decision, and one randomly chosen member’s decision is solely responsible for the entire 
group outcome, while other group members’ decisions are undisclosed.   
In the social psychology literature, the level of individual effort in groups depends on (i) 
the extent to which one’s effort is dispensable or not crucial to the group outcome (Kerr and 
Bruun 1983; Jones 1984; Karau and Williams 1993) and (ii) the extent to which effort is 
observable and identifiable (Williams, Harkins, and Latané 1981; Weldon and Gargano 1988). 
Based on these two characteristics, collaborative groups provide varying degrees of opportunity 
and incentive to “hide” yet nevertheless share in the group’s outcomes (Jones 1984; Albanese 
and Van Fleet 1985; Williams and Karau 1991). Experiments which, by design, make each 
member indispensible and identifiable eliminate incentives to hide while offering positive 
motivations for individuals in salient groups to increase effort. Our probabilistic design preserves 
incentives for free-riding alongside these positive motivations in our non-collaborative groups.  
The distinction between the social psychology notion of social loafing and the economic 
notion of free-riding is subtle. Both imply reduced effort when responsibility is diffused. 
However, while the antecedents of social loafing are psychological, free-riding is a strategic 
decision weighing the costs of effort against the potential benefits. Our design allows us to 
differentiate these effects. By varying the numbers of options and states, we create tasks of 
varying difficulty, while holding the rewards constant. Propensity for social loafing applies 
uniformly to all tasks, or potentially occurs even more on easier tasks as these offer less intrinsic 
reward (Harkins and Petty 1982; Jackson and Williams 1985). Conversely, free riding is much 
more likely on harder tasks, holding potential rewards constant, as these reduce the pecuniary 
returns on one’s effort. In our non-collaborative treatment, we find significantly reduced 
performance on harder tasks, but not easier ones, suggesting that free-riding is a more likely 
explanation than social loafing.  
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An important aspect of our experimental design is that we compare group and individual 
performance on an intellective, non-strategic task where choices can be objectively ranked from 
best to worst. A number of past studies on group decision making have used judgmental tasks 
involving a strategic setting in which decision optimality depends on beliefs about other players5 
or a task in which decision optimality depends on idiosyncratic personal traits.6 For example, 
observing that a group selects a more risk-neutral lottery than individuals could suggest either 
that people are less risk averse collectively than individually or that people are naturally risk 
neutral but make better decisions within groups. In these tasks differences between group and 
individual decision making may conflate objective decision-making performance with groups’ 
tendencies to alter individual beliefs and traits (Stoner 1968). In contrast, choices in our 
experiment are invariant to personal traits and require only that subjects prefer more money to 
less.7 Our effort departs from studies which examine non-strategic play such as Gillet, Schram, 
and Sonnemans (2009) 8 and Charness, Karni, and Levin (2007, 2010) in one important 
dimension: our design makes it possible to vary the difficulty of the task by changing the number 
of options and the number of states describing each option. It is precisely this variability that 
allows us to examine the balance between the free riding and social responsibility forces by 
allowing us to increase the effort required to solve the task while preserving the benefit from 
solving it.  
Our second finding, that collaborative group performance is commensurate with the 
performance that its best member would have achieved on her own, implies that  groups neither 
                                                            
5 For example, in bargaining games, Cason and Mui (1997) find more altruism among groups than individuals while 
Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) and Luhan, Kocher, and Sutter (2009) find the opposite. In trust games, Kugler et al. 
(2007) find that groups send less than individuals in the first stage, while Cox (2002) finds no significant 
differences. Groups are better at deducing optimal strategies in p-beauty contests (Kocher and Sutter 2005), 
centipede games (Bornstein, Kugler, and Ziegelmeyer 2004), and signaling games (Cooper and Kagel 2005) but are 
no better at eliminating dominated strategies (Cooper and Kagel 2009) and are more likely to overbid in common 
value auctions (Cox and Hayne 2006; Sutter, Kocher, and Strauss 2009). Ioannou, Qi, and Rustichini (2011) argue 
that the role of group identity on individuals has been exaggerated. 
6 For example, differences between group and individual decision making may conflate decision-making processes 
with participants’ other-regarding preferences (as in bargaining experiments, e.g., Cason and Mui 1997; Luhan, 
Kocher, and Sutter 2009), risk tolerance (as in lottery experiments, e.g., Baker, Laury, and Williams 2008; Masclet 
et al. 2009; Deck et al. 2010) or other personal traits.  
7 Charness, Karni, and Levin (2007, 2010) compare individual and group understanding of probability, including 
stochastic dominance and conjunctive events, finding that collaboration improves the likelihood of correct answers. 
Conversely, Tindale et al. (1996) find that groups often favor intuitive, but incorrect, answers in tasks requiring an 
understanding of probability. 
8 Gillet, Schram, and Sonnemnans (2011) conduct a common pool dilemma experiment finding that groups make 
qualitatively better decision in a non strategic setting. Groups are more competitive than individuals in a strategic 
setting with their efficiency relative to individuals depends on the nature of the joint decision making process. 
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create knowledge nor suppress the most superior problem-solving approaches. This does not 
necessarily imply that each group actually identifies the most able member and blindly follows 
him or her. However, our results do suggest that, statistically, the best member’s likely outcome 
serves as an upper bound of what the group can achieve through joint effort, which is far better 
than what the group would do in the absence of collaboration. Taken together, our results suggest 
that payoff commonality is insufficient on its own to make group membership salient or, 
alternately, that free-riding can be a stronger incentive than that offered by group saliency. Yet, 
when groups collaborate, they can effectively identify and adopt the problem-solving approach 
of their strongest members. 
II. Experimental Design and Procedures 
Our experiment consists of either individuals or groups completing a series of decision tasks in a 
task booklet. In every task, there are a number of mutually exclusive states that occur with 
known probability. Subjects choose among a set of options where an option covers a given set of 
states. The tasks are identical to those used by Besedeš et al. (2011) in their study of individual 
decision making among the elderly. Figure 1 illustrates a task with four options, denoted A, B, C, 
and D. Options differ in the states they cover and no two options cover identical states. States are  
denoted and presented as 100 colored beads to be drawn from an urn. In Figure 1, there are 8 
lime, 36 pink, 45 white, and 11 green beads. After all subjects complete their tasks, the task to be 
used for payment is randomly determined. Then one hundred colored beads corresponding to the 
states of the chosen task are placed into a container, and one is drawn. Should a pink bead be 
drawn and the chosen option contains pink (only option A in Figure 1), a $20 payment is earned 
in addition to a $5 participation payment. If a green bead is drawn when green is not included in 
the chosen option (only option D in Figure 1), only the $5 participation payment is earned.  If a 
lime or a white bead are drawn, they will result in payment only if the chosen option contains the 
drawn color. The optimal choice is always the option which contains the largest number of 
beads, since that option has the highest likelihood of yielding a $20 payment.   
 As subjects enter the lab, they are randomly assigned to one of three concurrently-
conducted treatments: (i) individual, (ii) collaborative group, or (iii) non-collaborative group. 
Both collaborative and non-collaborative groups consist of three subjects each. Subjects in the 
individual and non-collaborative group treatments were directed to one large room where they 
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were separated by cubicles to make their decisions. Subjects in the non-collaborative group 
treatment are introduced to their group and are seated next to their group members, but are not 
allowed to speak to one another during the experiment. Each member is told to complete his or 
her own task booklet individually. After all group members completed their task booklets, one 
member was randomly chosen to have his or her decision determine the payment for the entire 
group. All group members earn the same amount of money based on this randomly-chosen 
member’s decision. The booklet chosen for payment was revealed to all members, so that each 
member in a group knew who made the decision which determined their payment. Booklets of 
the other two group members were kept private.  
BEADS # 
OPTIONS 
Circle the letter option of your choice. 
A B C D 
Lime 8     
Pink 36     
White 45     
Green 11     
Figure 1: Sample choice task 
Each collaborative group was taken to a private room. Each member read the instructions 
individually, allowing each to form his or her own opinion on the best procedure to solve the 
tasks. After all members finished reading the instructions, an experimenter gave the group one 
pen and one task booklet. From this point on, group members were allowed to talk and interact, 
and were required to complete a single task booklet as a group.  
The first task is a small 3-option 3-state task designed as a familiarization tool and used 
as an introduction to the experiment. Subsequently, each subject is presented with 18 tasks 
constituting a 3×3×2 within-subject design (Table 1). The first dimension denotes the number of 
options, the second the number of states, and the third the probability distribution over states. 
Tasks have either 4, 8, or 12 options each described by 4, 8, or 12 states (colors of beads). Two 
different probability distributions of colored beads are used. In PDF 1, some colored beads are 
more likely than others, while in PDF 2, each colored bead is roughly equally likely to be drawn. 
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Figure 1 presents the 4-option, 4-state, PDF2 task. Subjects can calculate the expected payoff of 
an option by summing the probabilities (number of beads) of states covered by that option. 
Tasks are given to subjects in the form of a response booklet which lists the 19 tasks on 
separate pages. Subjects record their responses in the booklet with a provided pen. To control for 
order effects, three different versions of the response booklet are used to vary the order of the 
tasks. Subjects were not allowed to go backwards in their task booklets, a rule enforced by 
experimenters.9 After completing the response booklet, each subject independently and privately 
completed a survey provided in a separate booklet.10 The survey included questions about subject 
demographics and the three-question cognitive reflection test (CRT, Frederick 2005). Given past 
research that groups often select “intuitive” answers over correct ones (Isenberg 1986; Kerr, 
MacCoun, and Kramer 1996), the CRT examines tendencies to suppress spontaneous answers in 
favor of reflective ones.11  
Table 1: Experimental Design 
          12 Options 
States PDF1 PDF2 8 Options     
4 8 12 
States States 4 Options                 
4 8 12 4 8 12 A B C D E F G H I J K L
Lime 
Lime Lime 
8 
2 2 
28 
7 7 1   1       1 1   1   1
Purple 
Purple 
6 
3 
21 
5 1 1   1 1   1 1
Orange 2 7 1 1   1 1   1 1
Lt Blue 1 9 1   1       1 1   1   1
Pink 
Pink 
Pink 
36 
22 
18 
24 
11 
6 1       1 1     1 1 1 1
Yellow 4 5 1       1 1     1 1 1 1
Blue Blue 14 14 13 13 1       1 1     1 1 1 1
White 
White White 
45 
11 11 
26 
8 8   1   1 1   1 1     1 1
Brown 
Brown 
34 
19 
18 
7   1 1 1 1 1   1 1
Red 15 11   1   1 1   1 1     1 1
Green 
Green Green 
11 
8 8 
22 
13 13 1 1 1       1   1   1   
Navy Navy 3 3 9 9 1 1 1       1   1   1   
 
                                                            
9 We employed a two-pronged enforcement: experimenters observed the subjects throughout the experiment and 
decisions we marked with a special marker which made it impossible to secretly change a decision.  
10 Both the experimental task booklet and the survey instrument are available on request. 
11 For example, one of the three items asks “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the 
ball. How much does the ball cost?” The answer of ten cents is common, but on reflection, is clearly incorrect. 
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The experiment was conducted in the Behavioral Business Research Laboratory at the 
University of Arkansas in Spring of 2010. Subjects were recruited from undergraduate 
businesses classes. A total of 150 individuals participated in sessions over the course of 3 days. 
These included thirty subjects each in the individual and non-collaborative group treatments, and 
thirty groups (90 subjects) in the collaborative group treatment, for a total of 150 subjects. The 
subject pool was 33% female, 80% white (non-Hispanic), and averaged 20.2 years of age.   
III. Results 
A. Overall Performance 
We begin with a comparison of overall performance across treatments. Each task has a unique 
optimal option associated with the highest probability of payment. Collaborative groups make 
the optimal decision in 87% of all tasks, followed by individuals in 72% and non-collaborative 
groups in 67%. Expected payoffs, defined as the probability of payment from the chosen option, 
follow a similar pattern. Collaborative groups average a 75.5% chance of payment, followed by 
individuals (73.7%) and non-collaborative groups (72.3%). For both measures, the difference 
between collaborative groups and the other two treatments is highly significant (Mann-Whitney 
p<0.004).12 In fact, both measures are at least as high for collaborative groups as for the two 
other treatments in each of the 18 experimental tasks. The differences between the non-
collaborative groups and individuals are not significant (p>0.100).  
Figure 2 presents the distribution of expected payoffs by treatment. An optimal choice on 
each task would result in an expected payoff of 76.2% across all tasks. Nearly one quarter of all 
collaborative groups achieve this outcome, selecting the optimal option in each task. Again, we 
find that collaborative groups significantly outperform subjects in both the individual and non-
collaborative group treatments, with the collaborative group distribution of payoffs stochastically 
dominating the other two treatments (Kolmogorov-Smirnov p<0.004). For example, while 80% 
of all collaborative groups achieve an expected probability of payment above 75%, less than half 
of subjects in the individual treatment and less than one-third of subjects in the non-collaborative 
treatment do so. 
                                                            
12 Three subjects in the individual treatment and one subject in the non-collaborative treatment failed to provide a 
choice for one of their 19 tasks. Our statistical results are not sensitive to dropping these four tasks or to coding them 
as the minimum, average, or even maximum obtainable payoffs on that task. 
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Collaborative groups achieve significantly better outcomes than individuals. Overall, 
non-collaborative groups do slightly, but not significantly, worse than individuals. 
B. Individual Effort and Free Riding 
Next, we compare performance in the individual treatment to that in the non-collaborative group 
treatment. In both treatments, subjects complete the tasks independently and without any 
assistance from others. However, the non-collaborative group introduces two countervailing 
incentives. First, group membership and payoff dependence may encourage higher effort 
through, for example, a sense of responsibility for the welfare of others in the event one’s 
decisions are binding upon all group members. Second, effort is subject to a free riding incentive 
as a member can benefit from other group members’ efforts, and one’s own actions have a two-
thirds chance of being inconsequential. Which of these incentives dominates determines whether 
non-collaborative group members perform better or worse than individuals.  
To examine if free riding is exhibited, we take advantage of our experimental design by 
comparing performance on tasks of varying difficulty. A task with twelve options and twelve 
Figure 2: Cumulative distribution of expected payoffs by treatment 
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states, for example, requires more effort to identify the optimal option than a task with four 
options and four states. As task difficulty increases, the demands on effort increase. The benefit 
from exerting that effort remains constant as each task is equally likely to be selected for 
payment. We would expect performance to decline with task complexity across all treatments. 
However, if members of non-collaborative groups are free riding on the effort of others, we 
would expect a greater discrepancy between non-collaborative groups and individuals on hard 
tasks than on easy ones. 
Although we cannot directly observe an individual’s effort we make the assumption the 
effort subjects invest in solving a problem is reflected in their performance on the task. To the 
extent that an individual’s abilities and effort is correlated with the cognitive reflection test, we 
can compare subjects in the three treatments along the CRT dimension. Subjects in the individual 
treatment perform the best, answering correctly on an average of 1.33 out of 3 questions. 
Subjects in the non-collaborative group answer correctly an average of 1.2 questions, while 
collaborative group subjects perform the worse answering correctly an average of 0.99 questions. 
While subjects in the individual treatment appear to do the best, these differences are not 
statistically different, not is the distribution of CRT performance statistically different using the 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov test. Thus, at least in terms of the CRT test, subjects in the three different 
treatments are of similar abilities.  
Table 2: Frequency of optimal choice in tasks of varying difficulty 
 Non-Collaborative Group Individual 
Easier tasks 70% 73% 
Harder tasks 47% 65% 
 
We examine the frequency of selecting the optimal option in relatively harder and easier 
tasks in Table 2. We define harder tasks as those with 12 options and 12 states with all other 
tasks defined as “easier.”13 Overall, subjects are much more likely to select the optimal option on 
easier tasks than harder ones (Wilcoxon p<0.001). Individuals select the optimal option in 73% 
of easier tasks, while non-collaborative group members do so in 70% (Mann-Whitney p=0.593). 
However, individuals select the optimal option in 65% of harder tasks, while non-collaborative 
group members do so in only 47% (p=0.032). Expected payoffs follow the same pattern, with 
                                                            
13 Similar results follow from a less-restrictive definition of a harder task as one with at least eight options and at 
least eight states. 
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individuals earning the same payoffs as non-collaborative subjects on easier tasks (p=0.525), but 
significantly higher payoffs on harder tasks (p=0.019).  
 
We conclude that subjects free ride in non-collaborative groups. Of course, free riding 
can occur to varying degrees, from slightly decreasing effort to completely abandoning effort and 
choosing randomly. Evidence suggests that the extent of free-riding is limited. For example, non-
collaborative group members select the optimal option in nearly half of harder tasks, which is 
below the rate in the individual treatment, but also well above the one in twelve chance implied 
by random choice. 
To determine if subject-specific differences across treatments can account for this result, 
we estimate the determinants of optimal choice in a probit model (Table 3). We include controls 
from our post-experiment survey for a subject’s sex, race, and the number of correctly answered 
questions on the cognitive reflection test (CRT score). Additionally, to identify whether there are 
significant differences between treatments in easier and harder tasks, we incorporate treatment-
specific dummies for task types. The reference category is the individual treatment in easy tasks.  
Table 3: Optimal choice in individual and non-collaborative group treatments 
Selecting the   optimal option 
      Harder Task -0.251* 
(0.152) 
Non-collaborative Group -0.520** 
× Harder Task (0.216) 
Non-collaborative Group -0.159 
 × Easier Task (0.133) 
Male -0.052 
(0.100) 
White 0.417*** 
(0.143) 
CRT Score 0.170** 
(0.070) 
Constant 0.170 
  (0.133) 
Observations 1,080 
Log pseudolikelihood -630 
Robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Confirming our aggregate results, there is no significant difference between individuals 
and non-collaborative groups on easier tasks while non-collaborative groups do significantly 
worse on harder tasks. Not surprisingly, subjects in both treatments do worse overall on harder 
tasks than on easier ones. Subjects with better performance on the cognitive reflection test also 
generally do better. Thus, we find evidence in favor of non-collaborative group members being 
less likely to invest effort in difficult problems and more likely to free ride on the effort of other 
members. 
The tendency to free ride is not observed uniformly across subjects. Instead, free-riding is 
observed primarily among men and among subjects who do relatively well on the cognitive 
reflection test. Figure 3 compares performance in individual and non-collaborative groups for 
these subcategories of subjects. The top-left panel indicates how women perform on tasks of 
varying complexity in the two treatments. On easier tasks, they select the optimal option slightly 
more in the non-collaborative treatment than in the individual treatment, while on harder tasks, 
they select it slightly less. However, these differences are not significant (Mann-Whitney 
p>0.429). Men, similarly, show no significant difference in performance across treatments on 
easier tasks (p=0.216) but do exhibit significantly different performance across treatments on 
harder tasks (p=0.039). Thus, men appear to free-ride by decreasing effort, especially on harder 
tasks, upon joining a group. Women, conversely, do not. 
 The middle two panels of Figure 3 reveal a similar result for the 45% of subjects who 
answered at least two out of three questions correctly on the CRT, termed “high CRT.” Low 
CRT subjects (who answered one or zero questions correctly) show no significant differences in 
performance between the two treatments on easier or harder tasks, and high CRT subjects 
showed no difference on easier tasks (p>0.460). However, high CRT subjects performed 
significantly worse on harder tasks in the non-collaborative treatment than in the individual 
treatment (p=0.010). We observe similar differences by race. Non-white subjects show no 
differences across treatments on either task type (p>0.380), while white subjects show a 
significant change in performance, especially on harder tasks (p=0.009). 
Since CRT scores are correlated with both race and sex in our sample (p<0.001), it is 
possible that one or more of these effects is spurious. We examine this possibility in Table 4 by 
introducing dummy variables for non-collaborative group performance on harder tasks for male,  
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Figure 3: Free riding in non-collaborative groups 
Performance on hard tasks and easier tasks in non-collaborative group versus individual 
treatments 
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white, and high CRT subjects, in addition to a general dummy variable for harder tasks.14 The 
dummy for harder tasks is not statistically significant, while males and high CRT subjects do 
worse on harder tasks in non-collaborative groups. This indicates that free-riding, and the 
resulting reduced performance of non-collaborative groups, is primarily the result of effort 
reduction on the part of males (p=0.042) and high CRT subjects (p=0.019).  
Table 4: Free-riding in non-collaborative groups by subject characteristics 
Selecting the   optimal option 
Harder Task  ‐0.178 
(0.239) 
Non‐collaborative Group  ‐0.489* 
× Harder Task x Male  (0.240) 
Non‐collaborative Group  0.126 
× Harder Task x White  (0.289) 
Non‐collaborative Group  ‐0.637** 
 × Harder Task x High CRT  (0.019) 
Male  ‐0.055 
(0.106) 
White  0.380*** 
(0.141) 
CRT Score  0.189*** 
(0.071) 
Constant  0.096 
   (0.109) 
Observations  1,080 
Log pseudolikelihood  ‐630 
Robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In the absence of collaboration and communication, joining a group reduces overall 
performance. In terms of the dichotomy between free riding (which is expected to reduce effort 
in groups) and social responsibility (which is expected to increase effort), the free riding effect is 
a stronger force for males, while women do neither better nor worse in non-collaborative groups 
than as individuals. Additionally, free riding is predicted not only by demographic factors, but 
                                                            
14 We examined the effect of other variables collected in our survey, including age, risk attitudes, and mathematical 
aptitude. These variables do not contribute significantly either individually or collectively, and do not change the 
sign or significance of the variables of interest.  
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also by ability. As CRT scores are correlated with overall performance, it is the most capable 
subjects who free-ride in groups.  
We end this section by examining the dispersion of choices. We do so by comparing the 
spread in the between the highest and lowest probability of payment based on the actual choices 
of the non-collaborative group members in each task. The average spread for non-collaborative 
groups is 8.06 percentage points in easy tasks, meaning that on average the best choice selected 
by a group member has 8 percentage point higher probability of payment than the worst choice. 
For hard tasks the average spread is 10.90 percentage points.  With a payment of $20 at stake, 
this implies an expected loss of between $1.61 and $2.20 if the worst member in the non-
collaborative group determines the payoff. We compare these results to the average spread from 
the 4,060 hypothetical groups that can be formed using the responses of subjects in the individual 
treatment. In the hypothetical groups the average spreads are only 5.03 percentage points in the 
easy task and 5.22 percentage points in the hard task, suggesting approximate potential losses of 
only $1 given the $20 stakes. We next turn to examining the effect of groups that are free to 
communicate and collaborate.  
C. Collaboration 
Before we can examine how collaboration affects the balance between the free riding and social 
responsibility forces, we need to examine how groups use each member’s knowledge. When 
individuals collaborate on a common decision, the degree of success depends on both the group’s 
aggregation of its members’ knowledge, and on the group’s ability to create knowledge beyond 
what any one member possesses. Aggregation can take several forms. If a group member is 
chosen to solve the problem for reasons uncorrelated with ability (e.g., charisma), then groups 
would do as well as individuals, on average. A proportionality or majority procedure can be 
expected to reinforce predominant attitudes of its members. In the best case, the approach of the 
most capable member is adopted, a so-called “truth wins” standard (Steiner 1972; Davis 1973; 
Cooper and Kagel 2005). If groups create knowledge and not merely aggregate it, then groups 
exhibit “assembly bonus effects” by which performance exceeds even what the most capable 
member could have achieved on her own (Laughlin, Bonner, and Miner 2002). However, most 
evidence suggests that “assembly bonus effects” and even “truth wins” are rare, as groups rarely 
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perform as well as their best member (Hill 1982; Tindale and Larson 1992; MacCoun 1998; Kerr 
and Tindale 2004; Forysth 2009). 
To examine which of the aggregation benchmarks best describes our data, we compare 
the outcomes of collaborative groups with the aggregated judgments of the same number of 
subjects in the individual treatment. We formulate all 4,060 possible combinations of three 
subjects from the individual treatment. We call these three-member hypothetical groups, “triads.” 
For each triad, we calculate both the highest payoff of the three individuals (a “truth wins triad”) 
and the average payoff of the three individuals (an “averaging triad”). These hypothetical payoffs 
of triads are compared to the actual payoffs of collaborative groups. 
In Figure 4, we present the cumulative distribution of payoffs for both collaborative 
groups and for averaging triads and truth wins triads. Collaborative groups do not appear to 
select one member randomly to make the decision for the group. Collaborative group 
performance is far better than, and stochastically dominates, the averaging triads (t-test, Mann- 
Whitney, and Kolmogorov Smirnov p<0.001).15 However, the performance of collaborative  
 
                                                            
15 Both the parametric and non-parametric test results also hold with p<0.001 if variance is adjusted using 
Abrevaya’s (2008) recombinant estimator. 
Figure 4: Performance of collaborative groups and hypothetical groups of individuals 
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groups is indistinguishable from that of the truth wins triads. Both in expectation and in 
distribution, we cannot reject that collaborative groups do as well (p>0.594). Simply put, 
collaborative groups are great aggregators of existing knowledge. 
In the previous subsection, we identified free riding among male and high CRT subjects 
in non-collaborative groups. These subjects performed significantly worse on harder tasks as 
members of non-collaborative groups than as individuals. We next examine whether similar free-
riding is exhibited in collaborative groups. On one hand, some individuals may have even greater 
incentive to free ride in collaborative groups than non-collaborative ones, especially if they 
perceive their effort as dispensable (Kerr and Bruun 1983; Jones 1984; Karau and Williams 
1993). On the other hand, the greater saliency of group membership brought about by joint 
decision making and collaboration may reduce psychological incentives to reduce effort (Tajfel 
and Turner 1986; Wagner 1995; Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini 2007; Sutter 2009).  
In Table 5, we compare performance in individual and collaborative treatments using the 
same variables as in Table 4. As these treatments are not directly comparable (we do not observe 
individual choices in the collaborative treatment), we adopt two empirical strategies. First, we 
analyze the likelihood of selecting the optimal strategy at the subject level with each 
collaborative group member inheriting the outcome of the group. We conduct a weighted probit, 
with each collaborative group member receiving one-third weight. Second, we perform the same 
analysis at the group level. Here, we compare the actual decisions of collaborative groups with 
those of our 4,060 “truth wins” triads to reflect hypothetical group performance from the 
individual treatment. Demographic variables (male, white, CRT score) reflect the average of 
each of these variables for collaborative groups and truth wins triads. We apply a weight of 
30/4060 to each triad to equalize the relative importance of each treatment.  
The subject level analysis assumes that each collaborative group subject did as well as the 
entire group, while the group level analysis assumes that each subject in the individual treatment 
did as well as the best of each three-member triads in which he is a member. Both approaches 
yield the same overall result: while performance depends on subject and task characteristics, 
there is no evidence of free-riding. While performance on harder tasks is generally lower for all 
subjects, neither men nor high CRT subjects—the two groups that exhibited free-riding in non-
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collaborative groups—appear to perform any differently from other subjects in collaborative 
groups.16 
Table 5: Optimal choice in individual and collaborative group treatments 
Subject Level  Group Level 
      Harder Task  ‐0.504***  ‐0.138 
   (0.140)  (0.110) 
Collaborative Group  0.151  ‐0.253 
 × Harder Task × Male   (0.237)  (0.431) 
Collaborative Group  0.089  ‐0.264 
× Harder Task × White   (0.240)  (0.394) 
Collaborative Group  ‐0.065  ‐0.680 
× Harder Task × High CRT   (0.232)  (0.678) 
Male  ‐0.008  ‐0.090 
 (0.132)  (0.234) 
White  0.518***  0.232 
 (0.163)  (0.167) 
CRT Score  0.162***  0.533*** 
 (0.061)  (0.098) 
Constant  0.350***  0.748*** 
    (0.122)  (0.140) 
Observations  2,160  73,260 
Log pseudolikelihood  ‐1,026  ‐20,762 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We conclude this section by analyzing the video recordings of collaborative groups 
which give us a source of additional data to examine which aspects of group formation are most 
important in making optimal decisions. We use the recordings to determine the leader of each 
group, whether there are slackers or confused members, and the amount of time it took groups to 
complete the experiment. We explore three definitions of a leader: first to speak, the person who 
speaks the most, and the individual who wrote responses. A member is a slacker if he or she 
never participated in the decision making process. Members are identified as being confused if 
they stated so at any point during the deliberations. In Table 6 we add this information to 
demographic characteristics and examine the performance of collaborative groups at the 
individual level. The addition of these variables sheds relatively little additional light on group 
                                                            
16 Results are similar if we instead use non-weighted probit estimation to compare collaborative groups to 
individuals. There is no evidence of free-riding in collaborative groups. 
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deliberations. The higher the CRT count of each member, the more likely it is the group will 
make an optimal decision. This is more than offset if the group member stated at any point that 
he or she was confused. The existence of a slacker does not harm group performance. The total 
amount of time it took groups to complete the experiment plays no role in how well they do. 
There is no leader effect, as the leader dummy is never significant, regardless of how the leader 
is defined. Finally, we interacted the leader dummy with high CRT count. It has a large positive 
effect only when the leader is defined as the member who wrote down the responses. 
Table 6 ‐ Video Analysis of Collaborative Groups 
Leader Definition 
Talked First  Talked Most  Wrote Responses 
Harder Task  ‐0.674***  ‐0.672***  ‐0.682*** 
(0.092)  (0.092)  (0.092) 
Male  ‐0.069  ‐0.070  ‐0.065 
(0.135)  (0.130)  (0.137) 
White  0.165  0.178  0.164 
(0.122)  (0.133)  (0.126) 
CRT Count  0.127*  0.178**  0.137** 
(0.070)  (0.087)  (0.065) 
Confused  ‐0.321*  ‐0.343*  ‐0.325* 
(0.186)  (0.178)  (0.183) 
Slacker  0.156  0.047  0.202 
(0.181)  (0.190)  (0.184) 
Total Time  0.001  ‐0.001  0.002 
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Leader  ‐0.012  ‐0.161  0.092 
(0.117)  (0.123)  (0.122) 
Leader*High CRT  0.383  ‐0.026  0.915** 
(0.387)  (0.245)  (0.412) 
Constant  1.038***  1.114***  0.967*** 
(0.233)  (0.232)  (0.237) 
Observations  1,620  1620  1,620 
Log pseudolikelihood  ‐589  ‐588  ‐585 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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IV. Conclusion 
The effect of group decision making depends on both the effect of group membership and the 
effect of collaboration within groups. Group membership, in itself, introduces an additional sense 
of responsibility, especially if others are sharing in the fruits of one’s labor. However, groups can 
also diffuse responsibility, providing both psychological and economic incentives to reduce 
one’s effort. Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007) and Sutter (2009) find that payoff 
commonality, in itself, leads to better decision-making. In their designs, each group member is 
solely responsible for a fraction of the group’s decisions and payoffs. Our results on non-
collaborative groups are contrary.  
While contrary, we do find our results and those of Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini 
(2007) and Sutter (2009) as complementary. Our design allows us to differentiate between the 
psychological motivations in groups (e.g., accountability and responsibility versus social loafing) 
and the economic incentive to free ride, which is exhibited by different behaviors on harder tasks 
than easier ones. In this context, these other papers demonstrate that group salience in addition to 
individual accountability and responsibility encourages better decision-making. Our results 
indicate that the diffusion of responsibility which often accompanies groups is a negative, 
offsetting, and stronger force. Thus, Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007) and Sutter (2009) 
find little evidence of the psychological construct of social loafing in groups. Our evidence 
agrees with this conclusion, but finds evidence of economic free-riding when groups alter the 
balance between the costs of effort and the rewards. As task difficulty increases, non-
collaborative groups perform particularly poorly.   
Yet, the change in design between our experiment and that of Sutter (2009), for example, 
is fairly subtle. Instead of each subject responsible for one third of the group’s decisions, we 
have each subject responsible for all of the group’s decisions with one-third probability. While 
these are identical in expectation, they produce entirely different results on the effect of groups. 
This suggests that the specific nature of payoff dependence is quite important for group 
performance. In our design, we observe that men engage in free-riding while women do not. 
Additionally, individuals with stronger analytical ability engage in more free-riding. This last 
observation is especially troubling for the performance of groups as these individuals are also 
more likely to do well on the tasks as individuals. Charbonnier et al. (1998) conjecture that those 
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who perceive themselves as better than other group members may exert less effort as they 
perceive less individual glory from their effort in a group setting. Overall, more research on the 
link between specific group mechanisms and performance is warranted. 
When groups make a joint decision collaboratively, we no longer find the free-riding 
effect. Allowing for communication offsets the free riding incentives which exist in the absence 
of communication. We find that groups which are allowed to collaborate freely outperform both 
individuals and non-collaborative groups by a wide margin, selecting the optimal option with a 
much higher frequency. In particular, collaborative groups do as well as the best individual 
member would have done on her own. Thus, collaborative groups appear simultaneously to 
minimize free-riding and to be very good aggregators of existing knowledge. We conclude that 
better performance does not necessarily follow from group saliency, in itself, but from the 
collaboration among group members.  
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Appendix: Experiment Instructions 
Instructions for Individual Treatment 
You will receive $5 for participating in this experiment and completing a brief survey.  You can also earn 
an additional sum of money based on performance in the experiment.  The experiment consists of 18 
tasks. You will be given a booklet containing the 18 tasks, and each task is on a separate page in the 
booklet. It is important that you make the choices in the order in which they are presented in the task 
booklet.  That is, you must complete the tasks in order, and once you complete a task you cannot go 
back to it.  Please do not go back to any previous pages. 
Each task requires the completion of a response form on which you will make a choice from a set of 
options appearing in a table such as the one below. In each task, you will select one of the options.   
TASK 
BEADS  # 
OPTIONS 
Circle the letter option of your choice. 
A  B  C  D  E  F 
Red  10          
Orange  30           
Yellow  60            
 
There will be a container of colored beads and one bead will be randomly drawn from the container at 
the end of the experiment.  A volunteer will conduct the drawing in front of you.  The column “BEADS” 
will list the colors of beads in the container and the column “#” will list the number of beads of each 
color in the container.  There will always be a total of 100 beads. Thus according to the above table the 
container will have 10 Red beads, 30 Orange beads and 60 Yellow beads adding up to a 100 beads. The 
chance that a particular color will be drawn is the number of beads of that color/100.  In this example, 
there is a 30/100 = 30% chance that an orange bead will be drawn. 
Under the “Options” heading will be a set of letters.  The letters correspond to the different options that 
you may choose.  In the example above, you could choose option A, B, C, D, E, or F.  Each option 
contains a series of marks corresponding to the colored beads.  For example, Option C has a mark for 
the color red only while Option D has marks for both red and yellow. Alternatively note that Yellow 
beads are present in Options A, D and E. 
For each task you must choose only one option by circling the letter of your choice with the provided 
pen.  Do not add any other marks on the page; just indicate your selected option by circling it.  If you 
make a mistake or wish to change your response, please raise your hand and inform an experimenter.  
Circling multiple options or making additional marks without informing an experimenter may result in a 
loss of compensation. 
After you have selected an option for each task, please close your booklet.  You may then complete the 
brief survey. 
Once everyone has finished, a volunteer will pick a number at random to determine which of the 18 
tasks will be used to determine your payment.  Note that even though you are making 18 decisions, only 
one randomly chosen task will affect your payment.   
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First the container will be filled with 100 colored beads according to the “#” column of the selected task. 
Then one bead will be randomly drawn from the container.  If the option you chose for the selected task 
does not have a  mark for the color of the bead drawn, you will leave with your $5 participation 
payment.  However, if the option you chose does have a  mark for the color of the bead drawn, you 
will receive $20. This will be in addition to the $5 participation payment, making your total earnings $25. 
Below is an example.  Suppose the following task was randomly selected and the person had chosen 
Option F by marking it as shown below. 
TASK 
BEADS  # 
OPTIONS 
Circle the letter option of your choice. 
A  B  C  D  E  F 
Red  10          
Orange  30           
Yellow  60            
 
If an orange bead is drawn from the container, then this person as well as anybody else who chose 
Option  F would be paid the $5 participation payment plus $20 (for a total of $25). Also persons who 
chose Options B and E would receive the $20 (for a total of $25) since they contain a mark for orange.  
Anyone selecting options A, C, or D would only receive the $5 participation payment. 
After the drawing, a researcher will come to you to verify what you have earned.  The researcher will 
give you a claim slip that you can use to collect your payment as you leave.  When called, you will hand 
the claim slip to a researcher who will ask you to sign a receipt in exchange for your money.  You will 
then drop your response booklet, survey, and pen in a large box.  This process is designed to ensure that 
no one, including the researchers, can ever know the responses of any individual. 
If you have any questions about the experiment, please ask now. 
Otherwise, please wait quietly until you are taken to a room to complete the response booklet.  Once 
there, you may open your response booklet and begin with Task 1.  Keep in mind that you cannot go 
backwards through the booklet and should not skip around.  Once you complete the booklet, close it 
and begin the survey.  Please do not go back to the booklet once it has been closed. 
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Instructions for Collaborative Group Treatment 
You will receive $5 for participating in this experiment and completing a brief survey.  You can also earn 
an additional sum of money based on performance in the experiment.  The experiment consists of 18 
tasks.  You will be given a booklet containing the 18 tasks, and each task is on a separate page in the 
booklet.   
You will be put into a group of three to complete the task booklet.  Group members will be randomly 
chosen. You will all work together to make choices for the 18 tasks. It is important that you make the 
choices in the order in which they are presented in the experiment booklet. That is, you must complete 
the tasks in order, and once you complete a task you cannot go back to it.  Please do not go back to any 
previous pages. 
Each task requires the completion of a response form on which you will make a choice from a set of 
options appearing in a table such as the one below. In each task, you will select one of the options.   
TASK 
BEADS  # 
OPTIONS 
Circle the letter option of your choice. 
A  B  C  D  E  F 
Red  10          
Orange  30           
Yellow  60            
 
There will be a container of colored beads and one bead will be randomly drawn from the container at 
the end of the experiment.  A volunteer will conduct the drawing in front of you.  The column “BEADS” 
will list the colors of beads in the container and the column “#” will list the number of beads of each 
color in the container.  There will always be a total of 100 beads. Thus according to the above table the 
container will have 10 Red beads, 30 Orange beads and 60 Yellow beads adding up to a 100 beads. The 
chance that a particular color will be drawn is the number of beads of that color/100.  In this example, 
there is a 30/100 = 30% chance that an orange bead will be drawn. 
Under the “Options” heading will be a set of letters.  The letters correspond to the different options that 
your group may choose.  In the example above, you could choose option A, B, C, D, E, or F.  Each option 
contains a series of marks corresponding to the colored beads.  For example, Option C has a mark for 
the color red only while Option D has marks for both red and yellow. Alternatively note that Yellow 
beads are present in Options A, D and E. 
For each task your group must choose only one option by circling the letter of your choice with the 
provided pen.  Do not add any other marks on the page; just indicate your selected option by circling it.  
If you make a mistake or wish to change your response, please raise your hand and inform an 
experimenter.  Circling multiple options or making additional marks without informing an experimenter 
may result in a loss of compensation. 
After your group has selected an option for each task, please close your booklet.  You may then 
complete the brief survey individually. 
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Once everyone has finished, a volunteer will pick a number at random to determine which of the 18 
tasks will be used to determine your payment.  Note that even though you are making 18 decisions, only 
one randomly chosen task will affect your payment.   
First the container will be filled with 100 colored beads according to the “#” column of the selected task. 
Then one bead will be randomly drawn from the container.  If the option your group chose for the 
selected task does not have a  mark for the color of the bead drawn, every member of your group will 
leave with their $5 participation payment.  However, if your group’s chosen option does have a mark 
for the color of the bead drawn, you will each receive an additional $20, making your total earnings $25. 
Below is an example.  Suppose the following task was randomly selected and the group had chosen 
Option F by marking it as shown below. 
TASK 
BEADS  # 
OPTIONS 
Circle the letter option of your choice. 
A  B  C  D  E  F 
Red  10          
Orange  30           
Yellow  60            
 
If an orange bead is drawn from the container, then everyone in this group as well as everyone in any 
other group who chose Option F would be paid the $5 participation payment plus $20 (for a total of $25 
each). Also every member of groups that chose Options B and E would receive the $20 (for a total of 
$25) since they contain a mark for orange.  Members of groups that selected options A, C, or D would 
only receive the $5 participation payment. 
After the drawing, a researcher will come to you to verify what you have earned.  The researcher will 
give you a claim slip that you can use to collect your payment as you leave.  When called, you will hand 
the claim slip to a researcher who will ask you to sign a receipt in exchange for your money.  You will 
then drop your response booklet, survey, and blue ink pen in a large box.  This process is designed to 
ensure that no one, including the researchers, can ever know the responses of any individual. 
If you have any questions about the experiment, please ask now. 
Otherwise, please wait quietly until you are taken to a room to complete the response booklet.  Once 
there, you may open your group’s response booklet and begin with Task 1.  Keep in mind that you 
cannot go backwards through the booklet and should not skip around.  Once you complete the booklet, 
close it and begin the survey.  Please do not go back to the booklet once it has been closed. 
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Instructions for Non-Collaborative Group Treatment 
You will receive $5 for participating in this experiment and completing a brief survey.  You can also earn 
an additional sum of money based on performance in the experiment.  The experiment consists of 18 
tasks.  You will be given a booklet containing the 18 tasks, and each task is on a separate page in the 
booklet. 
You will be put into a group of three, but each of you will complete the task booklet individually.  Group 
members will be randomly chosen. At the end of the experiment, the task booklet of one member of 
your group will be randomly selected and their decision will be used to determine the payoff for 
everyone in your group.  It is important that you make the choices in the order in which they are 
presented in the experiment booklet.  That is, you must complete the tasks in order, and once you 
complete a task you cannot go back to it.  Please do not go back to any previous pages. 
Each task requires the completion of a response form on which you will make a choice from a set of 
options appearing in a table such as the one below. In each task, you will select one of the options.   
TASK 
BEADS  # 
OPTIONS 
Circle the letter option of your choice. 
A  B  C  D  E  F 
Red  10          
Orange  30           
Yellow  60            
 
There will be a container of colored beads and one bead will be randomly drawn from the container at 
the end of the experiment.  A volunteer will conduct the drawing in front of you.  The column “BEADS” 
will list the colors of beads in the container and the column “#” will list the number of beads of each 
color in the container.  There will always be a total of 100 beads. Thus according to the above table the 
container will have 10 Red beads, 30 Orange beads and 60 Yellow beads adding up to a 100 beads. The 
chance that a particular color will be drawn is the number of beads of that color/100.  In this example, 
there is a 30/100 = 30% chance that an orange bead will be drawn. 
Under the “Options” heading will be a set of letters.  The letters correspond to the different options that 
you may choose.  In the example above, you could choose option A, B, C, D, E, or F.  Each option 
contains a series of marks corresponding to the colored beads.  For example, Option C has a mark for 
the color red only while Option D has marks for both red and yellow. Alternatively note that Yellow 
beads are present in Options A, D and E. 
For each task you must choose only one option by circling the letter of your choice with the provided 
pen.  Do not add any other marks on the page; just indicate your selected option by circling it.  If you 
make a mistake or wish to change your response, please raise your hand and inform an experimenter.  
Circling multiple options or making additional marks without informing an experimenter may result in a 
loss of compensation. 
After you have selected an option for each task, please close your booklet.  You may then complete the 
brief survey individually. 
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Once everyone has finished, a volunteer will randomly determine which one group member’s booklet 
will be used.  In other words decisions made by one person in the group will determine the payoffs of all 
the others in the group.  The volunteer will also pick a number at random to determine which of the 18 
tasks will be used to determine your payment.  Note that even though you are making 18 decisions, only 
one randomly chosen task will affect your payment.   
First the container will be filled with 100 colored beads according to the “#” column of the selected task. 
Then one bead will be randomly drawn from the container.  If the option your group chose for the 
selected task does not have a  mark for the color of the bead drawn, every member of your group will 
leave with their $5 participation payment.  However, if your group’s chosen option does have a mark 
for the color of the bead drawn, you will all receive an additional $20, making your total earnings $25. 
Below is an example.  Suppose the following task was randomly selected and the group had chosen 
Option F by marking it as shown below. 
TASK 
BEADS  # 
OPTIONS 
Circle the letter option of your choice. 
A  B  C  D  E  F 
Red  10          
Orange  30           
Yellow  60            
 
If an orange bead is drawn from the container, then everyone in this group as well as everyone in any 
other group who chose Option F would be paid the $5 participation payment plus $20 (for a total of $25 
each). Also every member of groups that chose Options B and E would receive the $20 (for a total of 
$25) since they contain a mark for orange.  Members of groups that selected options A, C, or D would 
only receive the $5 participation payment. 
After the drawing, a researcher will come to you to verify what you have earned.  The researcher will 
give you a claim slip that you can use to collect your payment as you leave.  When called, you will hand 
the claim slip to a researcher who will ask you to sign a receipt in exchange for your money.  You will 
then drop your response booklet, survey, and blue ink pen in a large box.  This process is designed to 
ensure that no one, including the researchers, can ever know the responses of any individual. 
If you have any questions about the experiment, please ask now. 
Otherwise, please wait quietly until you are taken to a room to complete the response booklet.  Once 
there, you may open your group’s response booklet and begin with Task 1.  Keep in mind that you 
cannot go backwards through the booklet and should not skip around.  Once you complete the booklet, 
close it and begin the survey.  Please do not go back to the booklet once it has been closed. 
 
 
